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Soft, Normative or Transformative Power: 
What Do the EU’s Communications with Eastern Partners 
Reveal About its Influence? 
Antoaneta Dimitrova, Maxim Boroda, Tatsiana Chulitskaya, 
Veaceslav Berbeca and Tatiana Parvan 
 
Abstract 
In 2014-2015, the European Union revised its neighbourhood policy (ENP), aiming to introduce more 
differentiation and a more pragmatic approach to the varying levels of ambition for cooperation or integration 
of neighbouring countries. The Eastern Partnership, a policy explicitly targeting the EU’s eastern neighbours, has 
encountered serious setbacks in the face of Russia’s increasingly aggressive stance. Communication about what 
the EU does with and for neighbouring states is an essential component for the success of the revised ENP, 
especially given rising concerns about Russia’s use of media to promote its own view of developments in the 
region and the choices of neighbouring countries as a zero sum game.  
 
This paper seeks to establish what the EU’s communications reveal about its status as soft, normative or 
transformative power in the region. The paper analyses the EU’s communications towards Belarus, Moldova and 
Ukraine for a two-month period in 2016, after the adoption of the revised ENP. To guide the analysis, the paper 
revisits the concepts of soft, normative and transformative power. Comparing the scope and elements of these 
concepts, we suggest that transformative power approaches stress a broad spectrum of reform targeting future 
members, while soft and normative power address any third states. Soft power includes economic aspects 
contributing to the EU’s (or other powers) attractiveness, while as a normative power the EU focuses primarily 
on norms. Using this framework, the paper finds that the EU’s official communications to Belarus, Moldova and 
Ukraine represented a different mix of elements. 
 
Communications to Belarus were different from the communications to the other two states, stressing normative 
and rights issues. The range of concepts addressed in communications to Moldova and Ukraine has been broader 
and more varied. The main emphasis in communications to Ukraine and Moldova were democratic governance 
(Ukraine) and economic reforms (Moldova). Therefore, it is possible to distinguish normative and transformative 
power elements in the EU’s communications to the three Eastern Partnership countries. Last but not least, there 
is still a substantial share of messages that are event driven, that is, focus on specific events rather than on the 
benefits of cooperation with the EU as a whole.  
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1.  Waning power? 1 
 
For two decades after the fall of communism, the European Union (EU) appeared to yield the power to get 
neighbouring European states to want what it wanted, as Joseph Nye (1990) famously defined soft power. The 
focus on norms in the Union’s relations with third states seemed to make it unique among international actors 
and led some to label it a “normative power” (Manners 2002, 2009). For states which wanted to join the EU, the 
Union did not only promote international norms, but encouraged a wide range of reforms related to democracy, 
market economy and good governance, earning it the classification “transformative power” (Grabbe 2004). Yet 
some twenty-five years later, the EU’s influence on its neighbours seems to be waning and its main policy 
instrument aiming to achieve stability and prosperity in its neighbourhood, the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP), appears to have fallen short of its objectives. Whether defined as a “soft”, “normative” or “transformative” 
power, the EU’s influence is founded on a complex mix of economic attractiveness, interdependence, the 
promotion of international norms and the potential promise for closer integration attractive for some of its 
Eastern neighbours. Ultimately the EU’s influence also depends on its actual policies and its ability to 
communicate them effectively. 
 
Despite the importance of the ENP, the review of the policy commissioned in 2014 signalled a recognition of its 
shortcomings. The review, presented a year later by the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy and 
Vice President of the European Commission Federica Mogherini and Commissioner for ENP and Enlargement 
Negotiations Johannes Hahn recognized that the EU’s policies needed to be changed to take into account the 
different aspirations of its diverse partners in the east and south. Not only the EU’s policies, but also the widely 
shared underlying assumptions about its attractiveness to its neighbours to the east, needed to be reassessed 
(Koenig 2016).  
 
The assumption that the EU’s attractiveness and conditionality can induce neighbouring countries to reform, 
become more democratic, and to open economically, dates back to the challenging, but successful Eastern 
enlargement. As an unprecedented crisis unfolded in Ukraine in 2013, however, following the refusal of former 
President Yanukovych to sign the Association Agreement with the EU, the Union’s approach and “soft power” 
did not suffice to change things on the ground (Maniokas and Zeruolis 2014).  
 
Overestimation of the attractiveness of its model (Romanova 2016) has not been the only reason why the EU’s 
influence has been challenged in its neighbourhood. Russia has been presenting countries’ potential integration 
with the EU as a zero-sum game, gradually moving towards a strategy using information as a weapon. The more 
unpredictable the situation in Ukraine became, the harder Russia has worked to communicate a zero-sum game 
perspective about, among other things, Ukraine’s Association Agreement, the ousting of President Yanukovych, 
the annexation of the Crimea and warfare in Eastern Ukraine (Pomerantzev and Weiss 2014). As analysts warned 
of the sophistication and scale of Russia’s propaganda efforts (Chifu 2015; Gotev 2014; Pomerantsev and Weiss 
2014), the EU’s institutions and member states started to realize they need to focus on information provision 
and dissemination and enhance their ability to put across the EU’s interpretation of events (European 
Commission 2014, 2015). The revised ENP policy, the EU’s Eastern Partnership and financial support for its 
                                                          
1 Research for this paper has been supported by country teams in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. We especially 
would like to mention the contributions made for coding and analysis by Ina Ramasheuskaya (Belarus), Igor 
Munteanu (Moldova) and Oleh Grytsenko (Ukraine). 
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Eastern neighbours (especially Ukraine) are less effective if they are not properly communicated and understood 
by citizens (Kimber and Halliste 2015). 
 
Targeting specifically information and disinformation issues, the European Council in March 2015 authorized the 
establishment of the East StratCom task force under the auspices of the High Representative for Foreign and 
Security Policy Mogherini. The main declared task of the communications team that has been created is to 
improve the EU’s strategic communication with regard to the Eastern neighbourhood.2 In June 2015 High 
Representative Mogherini also presented an action plan of strategic communication to address Russia’s 
disinformation campaigns. The Action plan has three main objectives, namely: 
 
 “Effective communication and promotion of EU policies towards the Eastern Neighbourhood;  
 Strengthening the overall media environment in the Eastern Neighbourhood and in EU Member States, 
including support for media freedom and strengthening independent media; 
 Improved EU capacity to forecast, address and respond to disinformation activities by external actors” 
(Action Plan 2015). 
 
Also in 2015, a working group of media experts, non-governmental organisations and communication specialists 
were brought together to analyse Russia’s media strategy and to recommend how the EU could counteract it.3 
The working group analysed existing Russian language media coverage in the Eastern neighbourhood and 
prepared recommendations for ‘bringing plurality and balance in Russian language media (EED 2015). 4  
 
These developments suggest that the EU is beginning to take more seriously Russia’s efforts to undermine its 
policies by creating a picture of a different reality (Pomerantzev and Weiss 2014). Russian narratives presenting 
the EU and the West as a whole as the enemy in a bipolar world have (re-)emerged. Russia’s communication 
strategy actively targets Eastern neighbouring countries, the Balkans and even some EU member states such as 
Bulgaria or Slovakia (Chifu 2015; Kiseleva 2015; Sinkukka 2014; Wiśniewski 2016).  
 
Yet it would be premature to claim Russia has prevailed as the new soft power in the region, as its own aggressive 
actions also undermine its image (Makaryshev 2016; Hudson 2015).  
 
In Joseph Nye’s original definition, “proof of [soft] power lies not in resources, but in the ability to change the 
behaviour of states” (1990: 155). Looking at the behaviour of the largest Eastern neighbourhood country, 
Ukraine, the EU has achieved more change in recent years than Russia5, at least in the realm of soft power (see 
also Moravcsik 2016). Russia’s attempts to change the country’s course by providing financial assistance as a way 
                                                          
2 Some of the new initiatives target Russian language audiences and disinformation among them: Russian 
language websites have been created in addition to existing Delegation websites 
(http://eeas.europa.eu/ru/index_ru.htm) and social media accounts (@EUMythbusters, #DisInforeview). 
3 The study was commissioned by the government of the Netherlands and conducted under the auspices of the 
European Endowment for Democracy (EED). 
4 Among the recommendations there were innovative ideas for supporting a ‘content factory’ for authentic local 
news and quality TV to be shared among Russian language broadcasters inside the EU. It was recommended to 
support EU-based Russian language news and television programmes to counteract some of the most blatant 
cases of misinformation and misrepresentation coming from Russia (EED 2015). 
5 Clearly, the Russian intervention in Crimea and subsequent hybrid war actions in the East of Ukraine cannot be 
subsumed under the heading of “soft” power. 
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to convince former president Yanukovych to reject the Association Agreement with the EU failed. Instead it was 
the citizens, through the Maidan movement, that changed Ukraine’s course. Their protests took place under the 
Ukrainian and the EU flags and stressed norms and principles that were seen as worth fighting for.6 Even if citizens 
have become less prominent as a power for change in Ukrainian politics after the Maidan protests due to the 
annexation of the Crimea and conflict in Eastern Ukraine, they still fight for reforms. Citizens that protested the 
failure to conclude the Association Agreement saw the EU as the vehicle for reform and improvement of 
governance in Ukraine. The question is, has the EU’s role as a symbol of good governance changed since then, 
because of the Union’s lack of unity and multiple crises or due to Russia’s active efforts to undermine its image? 
 
To answer this question, we need to analyse a complex set of policies and interdependencies that go beyond the 
scope of this paper. It is clear, however, that communications of its policies and perceptions of the EU are one 
important aspect of the EU’s soft power and contribute to the effectiveness of the EU’s policies. This paper will 
focus on analysing the concepts referring to the EU’s model of liberal democracy and market economy as 
communicated to Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. 
 
The paper analyses the actual content of the EU’s messages, as captured in official documents and public 
statements, in terms of key categories: democracy, rights, market integration, economic development, rule of 
law, security etc.7 The approach taken here emphasizes recent developments in official policy and public 
diplomacy on the EU’s part after the ENP review8. We start with a discussion of the related concepts of soft, 
normative and transformative power and their relevance for this analysis. Next, we review the findings of recent 
studies of EU communications and perceptions of the EU. In the following sections, the paper presents an analysis 
of the EU’s communications towards Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine for the period of February-March 2016. In 
the second part of the analysis, the paper also maps the channels and actors engaged in diplomacy on the EU’s 
behalf in the respective countries. Ultimately, we reflect on the content and actors communicating on the EU’s 
behalf in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. 
 
 
2. Soft, normative or transformative power 
 
2.1 Soft, normative or transformative power 
 
In order to establish whether the EU is still a beacon and a model for emulation in neighbouring countries or 
whether it is losing the battle for influence to Russia, we need to define the type of power and influence the EU 
is expected to yield. The most influential analyses of the EU’s role in its neighbourhood and further afield have 
developed the concepts of soft, normative and transformative power. In this section, these three concepts will 
be briefly discussed and the role of norms, ideas and communication of the EU’s model will be highlighted. 
 
                                                          
6 We thank Natalia Chaban for drawing our attention to the normative aspects of the EU’s influence on the 
Maidan movement. 
7 The choice to analyze not only norms related content, but concepts referring to economic or security 
cooperation is rooted in the definition of soft power adopted here, which is discussed in the following sections. 
8 Earlier communications and approaches have been thoroughly analyzed in the process of reviewing the ENP 
and the conclusions included in the ENP review and related measures such as the EU’s strategic communications 
action plan. Therefore, drawing on existing studies for background, we focus on recent communications. 
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In his seminal article about soft power Joseph Nye argued that soft or “co-optive” power means “getting others 
to want what you want” and that whoever possessed it would be able to influence other countries’ preferences 
by means of “intangible factors such as ideology, culture and institutions”. Being able to establish international 
norms close to their own norms, he claimed, would make states able to co-opt others. Soft power, in his 
definition, would also entail having attractive culture or ideology and creating institutions attractive to other 
states and capable of constraining their actions (Nye 1990: 166-167). Following Nye’s assertion that developing 
norms to be accepted by other states as universal is an instrument of soft power, we can claim that when the EU 
spreads norms related to democracy and human rights which were accepted by many states in eastern Europe, 
through the enlargement process in the late 1990s and early 2000, the Union was exercising its soft power9. 
 
A decade later, Ian Manners (2002) developed the concept of “normative power Europe” that focused even more 
explicitly on the EU’s dissemination of international norms as a way to define “normal” in international relations 
(Whitman 2013). Initially the discussion of the Union as a normative power appeared to be an answer to critics 
focusing on the weakness of the EU in military terms, but it quickly developed into something more, generating 
scholarship studying the EU’s normative identity and how it defined its actions in the international arena. 
Manners argued that norms, especially legal norms, have been part of the EU’s constitutive foundations and 
more important for the Union than for any nation state. The combination of the historical context in which the 
EU arose, its hybrid character and legal constitution ensure, according to Manners, that the EU places universal 
principles and norms (such as human rights or rule of law) at the centre of its relations with the member states 
and third states. The key norms EU stands for are defined by Manners as peace, liberty, including economic 
aspects, rule of law and human rights, supplemented by social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable 
development and good governance (Manners 2002: 242-243). 
 
In later work, Manners has emphasized the ideational nature of EU power, as opposed to material incentives. 
Normative power, in this definition, is rooted in legitimate principles, exercised through actions involving 
argumentation, persuasion, naming and shaming and, socialising in its impact (Manners 2009).10 
 
The question of to what extent the EU can make an impact as a normative or soft power is linked to the question 
of how others perceive the Union. Even though they have developed separately, literature on the EU as a 
normative power and studies investigating perceptions of the EU address two sides of the same coin (Larsen 
2014). From the growing group of studies that have asked the question whether others recognise the EU as a 
normative power, some recent findings suggest that beyond its eastern and southern neighbourhoods, the EU is 
not strongly perceived as a normative power (Chaban et al. 2016).  
 
Last, but not least, there is a rich literature on the EU as a transformative power (Börzel and Risse 2009; Börzel 
and Pamuk 2012; Börzel and Lebanidze 2016; Dimitrova 2002, 2004; Dimitrova and Pridham 2005; Grabbe 2004; 
                                                          
9 Despite the important role it played, the EU was far not the only external actor influencing the post-communist 
transitions. Other actors, such as the United States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) played a role in the early 
years. The EU’s role and actions in eastern Europe were effective in conjunction with these actors and in an 
international context fundamentally different from the current one. 
10 There is a rich literature that engages critically with the normative power concept and its limitations (e.g. 
Forsberg 2011; Nielsen 2013; Larsen 2014; Whitman 2013), which we will not discuss further here as the debate 
is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Vachudova 2005). In the 1990s, as the 
EU guided candidates from Central and Eastern Europe through extensive transformation and adaptations to 
prepare for full membership, the EU’s role was so important, that it was hailed as a transformative power. The 
mechanisms that played a role in moving candidate states to accept the EU’s conditions and rules were mixed, 
involving both normative socialization and (material) incentives and costs (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
2005). In the context of the EU’s Eastern enlargement, the Union exercised “passive leverage” on its neighbours 
simply by virtue of what it is as an economic power (Vachudova 2005). Analyses of the EU as a transformative 
power are, by and large, based on the EU’s impact across multiple spheres of influence in candidate and 
neighbouring states. Therefore, transformative power is rooted implicitly or explicitly in an integration model 
whereby the EU influences states which would like to join the EU or develop closer ties (Dimitrova and Pridham 
2005). The reach of the EU as a transformative power is thus limited to its neighbours and potential candidates, 
whereas soft and normative power may be projected further afield. The success of the EU as a transformative 
power depends on a number of conditions, such as the possibility to include a membership perspective for the 
countries it tries to influence and the fit with preferences of local elites (Börzel and Ademmer 2013; Börzel and 
Lebanidze 2016; Dimitrova 2016). Even for candidate states, the power of the EU to induce domestic reforms is 
limited by domestic factors and in the case of the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood, by Russia (Dimitrova and 
Dragneva 2009; Langbein 2015). 
 
2.2 Distinguishing the elements of soft power 
 
Comparing the concepts of soft, normative and transformative power, there is overlap between them, but also 
differences. A number of common features are shared by all three concepts. All three concepts, ideas, norms 
and ideologies, can make the EU attractive. Norms and institutions structure relations with other states, if these 
third states accept them as valid and universal. In contrast to normative power, both soft and transformative 
power are seen to include economic incentives and attraction based on economic interdependence.  
 
In terms of the differences, soft power stresses more what an actor (the EU) might project (ideas, ideology, 
institutions and norms), while normative power emphasizes what it is (see also Nielsen 2013: 728). 
Transformative power is linked to the integration of candidates or external governance towards countries 
engaged in various forms of regional integration with the EU and so geographically limited. In addition, 
transformative power includes the use of specific policy tools to support specific, pre-defined reforms linked to 
the EU model of integration in third states, chief among these being conditionality. 
 
The concepts of soft and normative power have theoretical and empirical limitations. They have been taken on 
board rather optimistically and uncritically by policy makers and experts in the 1990s. Defining the EU as a 
normative power has led to an almost apologetic discourse by some EU policy makers, which left many blind to 
the EU’s limitations in diffusing its norms in practice. Theorizing the EU as normative or soft power has similarly 
created a danger of overestimating its impact (see also Whitman 2013). Currently, we need to bear in mind that 
the EU’s soft power can and does decline as the Union becomes either less prosperous (as a consequence of 
economic crises) or less united, following the Brexit referendum. Last but not least, soft power, as critics have 
warned, requires a strategy and a “game plan” to be effective (Nielsen 2013). 
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These conceptual limitations translate into challenges for empirical research. The boundary between economic 
interdependence and norms in soft power is blurred. It is difficult to define where normative influences end and 
economic interdependence begins.11 Furthermore, economic power and interdependence can influence states 
even without references to norms and principles (Moravcsik 2016). International norms promoted by the EU, 
however, may complement and strengthen the EU’s economic attractiveness, or work in an opposite direction12, 
resulting in a complex mix of influences for neighbours. The conviction the EU has adhered to – that it is 
disseminating and projecting universal norms – is not always shared by other states (Chaban et al. 2016).  
 
Defining “soft power” following Nye (1990) as the power to attract rather than to coerce, in this paper we shall 
simply specify different components of soft power and establish what role they plan in the EU’s current 
communications, aiming, at a later stage, to look at how they are communicated and perceived. The components 
that contribute to soft power can be related to economic interdependence, financial assistance, trade, 
democracy, individual freedoms and (human) rights, norms, history and culture.  
 
Some of these elements, however, belong to more than one model of regional integration: both Russia’s Eurasian 
Economic Union (EEU) and the EU’s integration models create economic integration ties and deal with existing 
interdependencies. The mix of elements and the emphasis on specific aspects such as norms are determined by 
the type of governance the EU or respectively Russia exercise domestically. Therefore, while economic support 
and trade are features of both EU and Russian policies, democracy and the promotion of specific norms, such as 
the prohibition of the death penalty, are part of the EU’s identity and policies (as argued also by Manners 2002), 
but not Russia’s.  
 
Based on the above discussion, the EU’s soft power with regard to its neighbourhood can be viewed as rooted in 
1) what it represents as a union of prosperous states with free citizens13 as well as 2) its policies affecting 
countries and citizens in the neighbourhood, including, but not limited to the diffusion of specific norms the EU 
may see as universal and 3) ideas, messages and channels of communication, cultural links and historical affinities 
with countries in its Eastern neighbourhood14. When the EU emphasizes mostly its norms and values in 
interaction with third states, we can refer to its normative power aspects. 
 
As we are interested in ideas, principles and norms, but also in economic interdependence and economic 
incentives from the EU to its neighbours, soft power appears to be the broader concept that can cover references 
to different aspects of influence. For the EU to play the role of transformative power, more is needed: targeted 
conditionality linked to incentives for reforms, provided in the context of a process that can lead to a country’s 
eventual EU membership. Therefore, in our view, transformative power is not just a matter of a broad range of 
democracy, economy and policy issues the EU engages with. For the EU’s role as transformative power to work 
the components making up soft power are supported by active and deliberate promotion of a broad range of 
                                                          
11 As Manners (2009: 4) himself noted about normative power, it is often used alongside material incentives or 
physical force. 
12 Some EU norms, for example linked to LGBT rights, have been used in Russian media narratives to create a 
specific and negative image of the EU (Pomerantsev and Weiss 2014: 19-20). 
13 As discussed above, this component would be affected by disintegration trends in the EU as well as economic 
instability and crises. 
14 Similarly, Russia’s “soft power” would be correspondingly based on 1) its example or what it represents as an 
economic and trade power in the region, 2) policies (including current conflicts) and 3) ideas, ideology, culture 
and history and their transmission through various channels of communication. 
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reforms and the linking of success in these reforms to specific rewards, such as membership or visa liberalization 
(Dimitrova and Pridham 2005).  
 
Further in this paper we will look at whether and how the EU’s objectives, norms, values and interests are 
communicated with Eastern neighbours and establish how the various components of soft, normative and 
transformative power are mixed in communications with the EU’s Eastern partners. The differentiation between 
these three overlapping concepts will be used to distinguish the EU’s communicative emphasis in the second 
part of this paper. 
 
 
3. Recent studies of EU communications and their findings 
 
Critical analyses in the last few years have claimed the EU’s soft power is weakening because it is losing ground 
in communication towards its Eastern neighbourhood, especially in comparison with Russia (Bogomolov and 
Lytvynenko 2012; Gotev 2014). The EU’s messages towards its neighbours have been criticized for being 
ambiguous, uninspiring, lacking cohesion and being unable to compete with a more tailored Russian approach. 
However, there has been little in the way of empirical evidence to demonstrate that the public perceives Russian 
messages as better or more coherent.  
 
In recent years, academic studies have focused on the EU’s messages and their reception among elites and 
citizens in the EU’s Eastern neighbours (Chaban 2016; Korosteleva 2011, 2016). In contrast to an earlier period 
when the EU’s influence was examined largely in isolation (e.g. the literature on external governance, Lavenex 
and Schimmelfennig 2009), many, if not all, recent studies make an explicit comparison between the EU and 
Russia’s approach. 
 
Some have claimed that the EU has been losing the “soft power” contest to Russia – for example in Serbia (Chifu 
2015; Wiśniewski 2016) or the Eastern Partnership countries (Nielsen and Vilson 2014). Next to political 
communications, the use of emotional narratives evoking nostalgia for the Soviet past by Kremlin-affiliated 
media outlets has been highlighted as a distinct component of Russia’s new soft power (EED 2015). 
 
Kimber and Halliste (2015) have presented a rich and informative analysis of EU communications in Eastern 
Partnership countries and practical recommendations for EU related communications in Eastern Partnership 
countries. They stress that despite positive trends, much of what the EU and its member states do is still 
unknown. Even though the EU is the largest donor to partnership countries, Kimber and Halliste point out that 
citizens are often unaware of its contribution and benefits (2015: 4). They take stock of communication initiatives 
in the Eastern Partnership countries and public opinion trends and make an inventory of EU initiatives in the 
respective countries that can be communicated better. The report argues that the EU has difficulties in adjusting 
to the new realities of communication and creating differentiated and targeted methods of communication of 
its activities, instead of relying on people searching for information themselves. The importance of long-term 
communication strategies is often underestimated and even when there are strategies, they tend to stay on 
paper (Kimber and Halliste 2015: 25). The most important finding in the context of this paper is that EU 
communication towards the partners often tends to focus around specific events and visits of politicians or EU 
officials, without sufficient explanation about the general context of the visit or the EU policy. As the report 
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rightly notes, ”communicators need to move away from the standard approach using official meetings and events 
as the main source for EU-related news and replace it with important topics explaining how the changes and 
reforms will affect people in their daily lives” (Kimber and Halliste 2015: 26-28). 
 
Recent studies of perceptions of the EU provide an important nuance to the straightforward argument that what 
the EU does should be better communicated to reach the public. These studies argue that what the EU would 
like to project and what its partners or neighbours perceive or take on board in terms of norms, are different 
things. They stress the importance of an actor’s image, linking influence to how an international actor, in this 
case the EU, is perceived (Elgström and Chaban 2015; Chaban and Holland 2015). Some have shown that EU 
norms are received by other states as potentially contested, sometimes converging, but sometimes diverging 
with domestic norms (Chaban et al. 2016: 18).  
 
If we look at actual public opinion trends, the EU’s attractiveness and position in the region, as discussed in the 
introduction, are experiencing some decline. In all three countries examined here, the EEU is seen as a possible 
and viable alternative to the EU, with this trend most pronounced in Belarus (Korosteleva 2016). Public opinion 
trends from Moldova show a changing dynamic of support for regional powers, suggesting there is cause for 
concern regarding perceptions of the EU. Based on the Institute for Public Policy (IPP) public opinion barometer 
presented in April 2016, support for European integration has dropped: from 76 % in November 2007 to 63 % in 
2010 to 41 % in April 2016. Meanwhile, support for the Russian integration projects (Customs Union/EEU) has 
grown from 45 % in November 2014 to 53 % in April 2016 (IPP 2016). 
 
At the same time, the EU’s attractiveness is still considerable and based on the potential of free movement of 
people and education. In Ukraine, where the most positive attitudes can be observed, 50 % of citizens support 
European integration, as shown from a survey from the autumn of 2015 (DIF 2015). There is, however, 
considerable regional variation subsumed in these averages. In West and Central Ukraine, the view that Ukraine 
would benefit from European integration is shared by 77 % and 57.5 % respectively. Other regions have a 
majority of respondents that believe Ukraine has more to lose than to gain from (potential) EU accession. The 
main advantages of (potential) EU membership are considered to be free movement of people (39 %), welfare 
improvements (37 %) and free access for the young to study in the EU (34 %). Importantly, every fourth Ukrainian 
believes EU membership will facilitate domestic reforms in Ukraine (24 %) (DIF 2015). 
 
A cross-temporal public opinion analysis drawing on public opinion polls in Belarus in 2009, 2013 and 2016 also 
shows the EEU and the EU are considered rival integration models in the region. While recognition for the EU is 
rising, the majority of Belarus citizens would still prefer integration with the EEU (Korosteleva 2016). Awareness 
of the Eastern Partnership has increased threefold since 2009 (60 %), but respondents also believe there should 
be a new, stronger framework for relations between the EU and Belarus and that its most important goal should 
be strengthening economic and trade relations (48 %) (Korosteleva 2016: 6). 
 
The Belarus survey also distinguishes two different models perceived by Belarus citizens. The EU model is 
associated with liberal democracy, market economy, economic prosperity, human rights and individual freedoms 
(Kurki 2010; Korosteleva 2016: 8). The EEU, on the other hand, is associated with a model seen as closer to 
Belarus’ own and containing elements of ”social democracy”, albeit containing “a curious mix of qualities” 
(Korosteleva 2016: 8). Market economy and economic cooperation are seen as features of both models, although 
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in the 2016 survey, the EU and the EEU are perceived as opposites, unlikely to cooperate (Korosteleva 2016: 4). 
These results suggest that the elements which characterize the EU’s model and mode of integration are fairly 
well known and stable: on the one hand, political ones such as liberal democracy, rights, freedoms and rule of 
law, on the other, economic integration including trade, support for market economy, economic cooperation. 
 
Given the complex mix of incentives and norms contained in EU policies towards its Eastern neighbours and the 
amalgamated image of liberal democracy and economic cooperation in citizens’ perceptions, we believe that the 
broad definition and operationalization of soft power adopted here, including economic and democracy concept 
clusters, serves best as a tool to analyse EU communications. It is, however, possible that the EU’s 
communications would emphasize mostly norms and rights in which case it would be communicating as a 
normative power. By contrast, if the EU employs a broad range of tools at its disposal for integration, from 
communication to assistance, targeting a broad area of reforms, we can speak of communicating as a 
transformative power. We must note, however, that the leverage of the Union as a transformative power 
depends on much more than communications: the credibility of its promises and threats which are influenced 
by a host of domestic political dynamic and EU level factors.15 
 
Bearing in mind this caveat, we would seek to distinguish economic, democratic norms and reform clusters in 
the EU approach, as we will explain in the next section. The analysis that follows will examine the whole range 
of concepts associated with the EU’s liberal democracy and market integration model and establish which 
elements prevail in communications with Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. By analysing the EU communications 
for a specific recent period, it would also be possible to establish whether they are still focusing on factual 
information about specific events, a shortcoming highlighted in the report by Kimber and Halliste in 2015.  
 
 
4. Method and approach 
 
As discussed in the previous sections, the first steps in evaluating the EU’s soft power involve analysing the 
messages the Union directs at Eastern Partnership countries16 and the actors communicating them as part of the 
EU or on the EU’s behalf.  
 
In the first part of the analysis, we aim to establish the content of communications related to different categories 
that are part of the EU’s general model of integration. The second part of the analysis provides a comparison of 
the key actors active on behalf of the EU or its member states and actors friendly to the EU. This part also provides 
some illustrations of the content and topics of communications. 
 
The categories which we search for in the EU’s communications towards Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine are 
related to all three images of the EU discussed above: “normative power” Europe, “soft power” Europe and 
“transformative power” Europe. Based on the theoretical discussion about the sources and expressions of EU 
power above, we start with core political science categories such as democracy (elections, separation of powers 
                                                          
15 Such as, for example, statements of heads of state or parliaments about a country’s future relations with the 
EU (potential for membership or exclusion), national referenda such as the Dutch referendum on the 
Association agreement with Ukraine, public opinion about a specific candidate (on credibility, see also 
Steunenberg and Dimitrova 2007). 
16 Without, at this stage, making any claims about what elites and citizens perceive. 
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etc.), rule of law and rights (human, minorities etc.), then add mentions of the economy and market integration 
which are at the heart of the EU’s integration model and, last but not least, include categories such as public 
administration, reforms (in general), harmonization of standards, typical of the EU’s conditions for closer 
integration. We sought to distinguish concepts related to the three models and to assess them in the totality of 
EU communications for the period covered.  
 
Importantly, the selection and range of concepts we used for the content analysis also correspond to the 
Copenhagen criteria for EU membership as defined by the EU in 1993 (European Council 1993). These refer 
broadly to democracy (political integration), the economy (competitiveness and growth) and the acquis of the 
Union (harmonization of standards and policies). The Copenhagen criteria can be seen as the foundation of the 
EU’s transformative approach in the sense that they spell out for the first time a clear and comprehensive range 
of conditions which, once developed and specified by the Commission, indicate the areas of reform that the EU 
targets. We must note, however, that the EU’s transformative power, as mentioned above, does not materialize 
as a result of the formulation or communication of what the EU might expect from neighbours. The credibility of 
the EU’s threats and promises, as well as a host of supportive measures, from financial assistance to twinning, 
contribute to the transformative power of the EU.17 
 
Normative concerns: issues of rights, human rights or rights of minorities or groups and the death penalty are 
included within the first criterion of Copenhagen but also in the EU’s agreements with third states which do not 
aim to join the Union. When engaging with candidates, the range of political integration issues the EU raises is 
broader, for example democratic principles and procedures, elections, balance of power between different 
branches of the executive and so on.  
 
Economic issues cover the general state of the economy or market integration. Following Nye’s original 
discussion of soft power, we can classify references to economic reforms or market integration as elements of 
soft power. The transformative Europe mode of integration includes these political and economic elements, but 
also adds good governance aspects, especially public administration reforms or anti-corruption measures. Last 
but not least, for countries seeking closer integration with the EU, for example through Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade agreements, there are a number of categories relating to harmonization of standards and rules.  
 
Based on this conceptualization and adding a category to code for event driven, purely informative 
communications (Kimber and Halliste 2015), we have arrived at a broad set of 18 non-exclusive, core concepts, 
rooted both in the EU’s practice so far and in our pre-existing theoretical understanding of the scope of key 
concepts such as democracy or the market. The concepts and sub-concepts were specified in a codebook, which 
has been used to analyse communications from the EU towards Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova over a two-month 
period. The categories can be seen in Table 1 below, while the broader (non-exhaustive) list of categories and 
codes can be found in Appendix 1. 
  
                                                          
17 As this paper analyses specifically communications and does not include other measures such as financing, 
policy decisions or actions, we expect we can only say if the EU communicates as a transformative power, but 
not if it acts as one or has a transformative impact. 
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Table 1: General categories and clusters of core concepts as part of the EU model of integration 
Categories  Codes 
EU values 1 
democracy 2 
freedom of speech 3 
rights 4 
rule of law 5 
civil society 6 
market 7 
reforms 8 




regional cooperation 13 
visa facilitation 14 
sanctions 15 
people 16 
importance of mutual relations 17 
general informative (event-driven) 18 
 
In the analysis, we have interpreted each category to include related concepts and have coded these together: 
e.g. under democracy mentions of political parties and balance of power have been included, judicial reform is 
under rule of law, freedom of speech is grouped with media freedom and so on. The quantitative text analysis 
aims to establish the share of each concept in the total of concepts referred to in EU documents for the relevant 
period.  
 
We have focused on EU documents and communications that have appeared on the websites of the EU 
delegations respectively in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. Delegations are the channel through which the EU 
transmits its messages and an organizational actor in their own right, so the communications placed there are 
our main target. In the second part of the analysis, we map the actors that have been active on the EU’s behalf 
next to the delegations. 
 
The period of February-March 2016 has been selected as one in which average type of communications are 
assumed to have been exchanged and few major events have occurred to focus communications in a specific 
direction. The exception to this is Belarus, where EU sanctions were lifted in February 2016, which has resulted 
in more intensive communications and commentary related to this development. 
 
Three country datasets containing EU documents addressing the respective countries have been analysed. Each 
document has been analysed and interpreted by two coders, coding separately, checking for compatibility and 
resolving differences at a later stage. 18 
 
                                                          
18 Coders have checked interpretations and agreed on a single one before finalizing the country analyses. 
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As with every content analysis, the choice of unit of analysis affects the outcome. The smallest unit in which we 
have sought concepts and interpretation has been the paragraph. This decision is based on our observation that 
several sentences in a row (a paragraph) refer to one or two of our core concepts (e.g. reforms, democracy and 
rule of law, elections). Therefore, we expected analysis at the sentence level to produce too many redundancies 
and multiple references to the same concept, which are eliminated when taking the paragraph as unit of analysis. 
Given that a paragraph often contains references to more than one of the key concepts we are interested in: e.g. 
democracy and human rights and rule of law, the analysis has recorded more than one concept per paragraph. 
 
To illustrate how the documents have been analysed and coded, we provide two brief examples here. First, a 
press release on the European Union Delegation (EUD) website in Belarus. The press release is entitled ‘Drawing 
contest "Let's save Lake Svityaz together" and dates from 2 February 2016. The first paragraph reads as follows: 
 
“The project ‘Supporting the transition to a green economy in the Republic of Belarus’, funded by the European 
Union and implemented by the United Nations Development Programme in Belarus, invites children from 
Navahrudak and Navahrudak region to take part in a drawing contest ‘Let's save Lake Svityaz together’” (EUD in 
Belarus 2016). 
 
Analysing this paragraph, we have found codes related to the economy (10)19, to regional cooperation (13) and 
people and culture (16). 
 
Another example, from the EUD in Ukraine, is the document entitled “Statement of EU Ambassador Tombinski 
on the resignation of Minister Abromavicius”, dated from the 3rd of February 2016. It consists of one paragraph, 
namely: 
 
“Disappointed to learn about the resignation of my good colleague and friend Aivaras Abromavicius. He has 
delivered real reforms for the benefit of all Ukrainians. I applaud his efforts cutting red tape, improving business 
climate, introducing transparent public procurement and work on making Ukraine more attractive to foreign 
investors. It is important that Ukraine's leaders press forward on vital reforms” (EUD in Ukraine 2016). 
 
According to our reading, this paragraph contains references to democracy (2), the economy (10) and reforms in 
general (8). 
 
Ultimately, the aggregation of concepts was done at the level of the three country datasets covering the two 
months’ period. Then the data was analysed to establish the share of each concept in relation to the total number 
of concepts per document. The results are presented in the following section. 
 
  
                                                          
19 The numbers in brackets refer to the codes specified above in Table 1. 
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5. Country results: structure of communications  
 
The number of official communications for the designated period is shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Sample size per country for February-March 2016 
Country EU documents Total paragraphs Concepts per sample* 
Belarus 14 106 160 
Moldova 15 139 229 
Ukraine 33 128 176 
*Total in all documents for the two-month period. 
 
The analysis per country shows the content of EU communications has varied between the three countries. Table 
3 presents the top four concepts as share of total communications per country. 
 
Table 3: Most mentioned concepts as part of the totals per country 
Country Highest share 2nd  3rd  4th  
Belarus Rights 37% EU values 13% Regional coop 9% Rule of law 7% 
Moldova Reforms 30% The economy 17% General info 9% The market 7% 
Ukraine Democracy 20% General info (events) 13% The economy 10% Rule of law 10% 
 
To discuss the country results in some more depth, they are presented separately in the following charts.  
 
  




Chart 1: EU communications with Belarus per core concepts 
 
 
The results for Belarus are quite unevenly distributed between the various core concepts. The bulk of 
communications, 37% of all concepts referred to, are about rights.20 The second largest set of references is to EU 
norms and values in general (13%). Together these make half of all concepts referred to by the EU. Then follow 
references to regional cooperation (9%), rule of law (7%), democracy (6%) and general information (6%). We can 
safely conclude that the emphasis of the EU’s communications in the relevant period has been on rights, values 
and democracy. Based on these results and bearing in mind the necessary caution given the limited period of 
time, we can conclude that the EU has communicated towards Belarus as a normative power. 
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Chart 2: EU communications with Moldova per core concepts 
 
 
The set of concepts that the EU has discussed and communicated to Moldova is more varied than Belarus, but 
less varied than Ukraine, as evident also from the next chart. The emphasis in Moldova is clearly on reforms, 
represented by one third of all communicated concepts (30%), followed by the economy (17%). If we focus on 
the largest share of concepts communicated by the EU, the Union communicates with an emphasis on 
transformation and support for Moldova’s economy. The share of communication that has been event driven, 
purely informative, is relatively high at 9%. Based on the sample for our two month period, the EU has 
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Chart 3 presents the mix of concepts in the communications from the EU to Ukraine. The most important 
categories of concepts are discussed after the chart. 
 
Chart 3: The EU communications to Ukraine per core concepts 
 
 
The results for Ukraine show that democracy, as a general concept or the various sub-concepts associated with 
it, has had the most prominent place in the EU communications towards Ukraine in the examined period (20% 
of all concepts). The second largest category is purely informative, exemplifying the dominance of “event-driven 
communication” (13%) previously noted by Kimber and Halliste (2015: 28). Third, was reference to the economy, 
development and trade (11%), followed by rule of law (10%), rights (9%), civil society (9%) and reforms in 
general (8%). 
 
The relatively high share of references to civil society in the EU’s documents and communications to Ukraine is 
particularly interesting. The EU has a dedicated programme supporting civil society in Ukraine, active since 2014. 
The partnership between the EU and Ukrainian civil society is promising, given the active role Ukrainian civil 
society has played in reform, and also in EU related communications (Kimber and Halliste 2015: 22). 
 
On the whole, the EU has communicated with Ukraine on a broad range of topics across the board and references 
to various concepts are quite balanced and evenly spread. The communicated concepts are consistent with the 
EU’s declared objectives and interests, norms and values. The emphasis on democracy and economy and rule of 
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6. Country results: actors, channels and topics 
 
The analysis in the previous section captured only the official EU communications as found on the Delegation 
websites. The EU delegations are active and important actors communicating EU policy. Next to this, the 
delegations play an organizational function, acting as hosts and intermediaries for high level visits. In each of the 
three countries, there have been more actors engaging in public diplomacy and communicating the EU’s values, 
norms and positions. In the second part of the analysis, we have looked to provide a broader picture of the actors 
communicating on the EU and member states’ behalf and mapped the most active actors per country for the 
same period. 
 
Country experts have identified the most important actors active on behalf of the EU and have highlighted 
important topics of communication. The levels of activity of specific actors have been determined by assessing 
interviews and communications by these actors in the relevant period. The qualitative analysis has been 




The results for Belarus are shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Actors active on behalf of/ EU/member states in Belarus  




European Parliament  
Member states Active governments Active ambassador Active technical assistance 
Germany  + + 
UK  + + 
Lithuania + + + 
 
Given that the period in question has been one of renewed activities in mutual relations, it is no surprise that 
representatives of EU institutions have been quite active in communications with Belarus. The Head of the EU 
Delegation to Belarus has been particularly active in the period in question, with media interviews focusing on 
economic assistance and forthcoming elections. Commissioner Hahn has also been active and received media 
attention in the country. On behalf of member states governments, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linas Linkevicus 
has been particularly active and received media attention. The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human 
rights in Belarus, Miklós Haraszti, albeit not an EU representative, should also be mentioned with his interview 
focusing on the human rights situation in Belarus. This intervention illustrates the results of the quantitative 
analysis of communications in the previous section. 
 
Importantly, despite the fact that quite a few EU actors have targeted the Belarusian audience with their 
messages, due to the limited number of channels though which EU-related messages are relayed (mostly online 
non-government media), the public appeared only vaguely aware of the EU policy towards Belarus.  





The results for Moldova are shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Actors active on behalf of the EU/member states in Moldova  




European Parliament + 
Member states Active governments Active ambassador Active technical assistance 
Belgium  + n.a. 
Czech Republic + +  
France  +  
Germany  +  
Hungary  +  
Italy  +  
Netherlands  +  
Poland  +  
Romania  +  
Sweden + +  
UK  +  
 
An Association Council meeting with Moldova was held in March 2016 and has been reflected in the dataset of 
documents and communications. Remarkably, a great number of the EU’s institutions have engaged with 
Moldova during the period in question. Next to the Council of Ministers, the EU’s Head of Foreign and Security 
Policy Mogherini and Commissioner Hahn, the role of the European Parliament (rapporteur Petras Austrevicius, 
as well as the Head of the Joint Parliamentary Committee Andi Cristea) should also be noted. As in the other two 
countries examined here, alongside the EU institutions, the most prominent voices transmitting the EU’s 
messages in the domestic arena are the ambassadors of EU member states. The number of actors, especially 
ambassadors that have been active on behalf of the EU and its member states in Moldova in the chosen period 
has been quite large, the largest among the countries examined here, suggesting developing relations. Next to 
this, it can be noted that experts associated with various think tanks (Foreign Policy Association, Institute for 
Development and Social Initiatives IDIS, Expert-Group, IPP, Promo-Lex) have shared and promoted various ideas 












Table 6 shows the most active member states and institutions in Ukraine. 
 
Table 6: Actors active on behalf of the EU/member states in Ukraine 
EU institutions  
Commission + 
EAS  + 
Delegation + 
European Parliament  
Member states Active ambassador Active government Active technical 
assistance 
Germany + + + 
France + +  
UK + + + 
Sweden + + + 
Netherlands   + 
Poland  +  
Lithuania + +  
 
As can be seen from the table above, there are three member states which have been publicly active on EU-
related issues in all three dimensions: Germany, the UK and Sweden. Two more member states have been active 
in two out of three dimensions: France and Lithuania have active ambassadors and public presence of the 
government, but no significant bilateral technical assistance. Two other member states have concentrated most 
of their public presence in one dimension: Poland – on the active public presence of its government and the 
Netherlands – on the technical assistance programme. 
 
The topics covered by the EU-related actors described above in the selected period of time refer to political 
developments in Ukraine (e.g. EU reaction to the resignation of the reform-oriented minister of economic 
development and trade), and to the conflict in the East and Ukraine-Russia relations (statements on the Nadiya 
Savchenko case, on Crimea, and the Normandy process).  
 
The EU member state embassies have used their websites as a channel of communication, although one can 
doubt how effective this channel can be. The content and the frequency of updates on the embassies websites 
have varied significantly: from approximately three important messages per month on the websites of France, 
the UK and Sweden to only one significant publication on EU-related issues in two months on the website of the 
Netherlands’ embassy.21 
Next to the institutions and member states noted in the table, the role the UNDP local office has played should 
be noted. Although not (strictly) speaking on behalf of the EU, the UNDP is clearly an international actor with a 
                                                          
21 News and publications for the selected time period (February-March 2016) were no longer available on the 
websites of some of the embassies (Germany and Poland). 
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similar normative orientation. It communicated on similar issues and has been an active and engaged actor in 
the period in question. 
 
 
7. Conclusions and next steps 
 
The EU communications analysed above for the period of February-March 2016 provide a valuable initial 
overview of trends and actors, even if the limited timespan of the analysis requires caution in generalizing the 
findings. 
 
From the first part of the analysis, we can conclude that in terms of content, the EU’s communications towards 
these three different countries vary to a considerable degree, fitting with the new differentiated ENP approach. 
Towards Ukraine, the EU communicates by referring to a full range of areas of engagement, from democracy to 
security to the economy. The emphasis in the period in question has been on democracy. Setting these results 
next to public opinion surveys from Ukraine that highlight the aspirations of Ukrainians for freedom of 
movement, welfare improvement and education opportunities, we can conclude that the EU has the tools to 
make an impact as a transformative power. Further testing of this preliminary finding through discussions with 
citizens and focus groups is a necessary step to establish which EU communications reach citizens and what 
citizens make of them. The importance of regional variation in attitudes in Ukraine noted in the 2015 survey (DIF 
2015) should be taken into account in experiments aiming to establish whether citizens are more attached to 
integration with the EU or the EEU. 
 
By comparison, communication towards Belarus has been more one-sided, focusing on rights and EU values. 
Based on the share of concepts referring to rights in the total mix of communications to Belarus in the covered 
period, we can say that the EU presents itself more as a normative power. There are important questions, 
however, regarding the potential reception of the EU’s messages: we see that the reception of EU’s norms is not 
likely to be easily based on existing value orientations and expectations of citizens captured by the 2016 survey. 
The results of that survey show that two-thirds of Belarus respondents find that the relations between Belarus 
and the EU should focus on economic and trade relations, visa liberalization, and financial aid. The proportion of 
those who are interested in the EU’s democracy promotion is very small, only 8% (Korosteleva 2016: 4).  
 
The range of member state representatives engaged with Belarus is, as expected, narrower, reflecting the 
difficulty in operating in an authoritarian environment, where NGO actors friendly to the EU can be classified as 
“foreign agents”. The media outlets which are receptive for the EU messages appear limited. Therefore the 
question of whether EU messages can reach Belarus citizens also needs to be explored further. 
 
In the case of Moldova, based on the communication content and actors’ engagement over the two-month 
period, there has been wide and active engagement on the EU’s side, focusing on reforms and the economy. The 
engagement has been broad and suggests Moldova’s relations with the EU are in an active phase. The EU 
emphasized economic and reform aspects rather than democracy and rights, but given the broad range of topics 
and the emphasis on reforms, we can say the EU communicated as a transformative power during the time 
period we examined. 
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The question of whether messages about the EU’s support and policies have reached citizens in Moldova, 
remains, however, open. Public opinion trends for the last three years suggest that, as discussed above, support 
for the EU is diminishing (Institute for Public Policy 2016). Russia’s efforts to undermine the EU’s image and 
promote its own integration project, either the EEU or the Customs Union preceding it, seem to be affecting 
public opinion trends.  
 
The second part of the analysis covering all three countries provides evidence that member states and their 
governments and ambassadors are indispensable for communicating the EU’s engagement in its neighbourhood. 
In each country, member states seem to take the lead, based either on the respective countries’ strategies or on 
the presence of experienced and active ambassadors, or both. A number of active ambassadors in all three 
countries provide a voice for the EU’s policies and transmit the EU’s norms and values.  
 
The analyses here, however, represent only a first step. They establish the mix of concepts and the underlying 
policies contained in the EU’s official communications and transmitted by the actors engaged in the countries 
we examine. The presence of such official communications does not in itself ensure that the EU’s norms, values 
and messages are disseminated among elites, media or the public. The processes and channels of 
communication, key elite and media actors, as well as citizens’ perceptions, need to be studied to gain a better 
understanding of whether the EU messages have reached and can reach the citizens. Further research, building 
on this analysis, would need to test the content of communications for a different period. In addition, the 
perception of communications among citizens and experts would need to be verified. Last but not least, 
experiments targeting the impact of EU’s communications compared to Russia’s would need to be conducted to 
assess how effectively the EU communicates and to what extent are communicated norms and values part of the 
Union’s soft power. The discussion and results presented here provide a foundation for future work and show 
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9. Appendix  
A non-exhaustive list of concepts and codes 
Categories codes 
EU values in general 1 
EU norms in general 1 
Democracy 2 




Checks and balances 2 
Freedom of association and assembly 2 
Freedom of speech, media 3 
Rights 4 
Human rights 4 
Abolition death penalty 4 
Minorities rights and languages 4 
LGBT rights 4 
Rule of law 5 
Prosecution 5 
Legal procedure 5 
Civil society 6 
Non-governmental organizations 6 
Trade unions 6 
Market 7 
Harmonization 7 
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Economic growth 10 
Funding 10 
Support programmes (general) 10 
Energy 11 
Energy connections 11 
Security 12 
Stability 12 
Border control 12 
Conflict resolution 12 
Peace agreements 12 
Regional cooperation 13 
International organizations (other) 13 
Other regional bodies 13 
Visa facilitation 14 
Visa liberalization 14 
Sanctions or restrictive measures 15 
People 16 
Scientific cooperation 16 
Culture 16 
Importance of mutual relations 17 
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